ataylo76@syr.edu
I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Syracuse University. I was previously a Senior Researcher in the Chair for Ethics and Political Philosophy at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. Before that, I was a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow in Politics at the University of Oxford (Nuffield College), where I also received my D.Phil.
My research interests are in moral, political, and legal philosophy. At the moment I am interested in the moral relationship between individuals and unjust states: whether there is ever a requirement to comply with unjust laws; when disobedience and resistance are permissible; and how these questions connect to territorial rights and international law. My recent work develops a political liberal approach to legitimacy, authority, and reasonable disagreement—including a book manuscript, The Limits of Liberal Legitimacy.
Book:
The Limits of Liberal Legitimacy.
—Under review with Oxford University Press.
Articles:
"The Limits of Reasonable Disagreement," The Philosophical Review 135, 2026, pp. 417-452.
"Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, and Stability for the Right Reasons," The Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of John Rawls, edited by Christie Hartley, Blain Neufeld, and Lori Watson (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2025). [with Paul Billingham]
"Territorial Jurisdiction: A Functionalist Account," Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume X, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. 86–108.
"Can Civic Friendship Ground Public Reason?" The Philosophical Quarterly 74, 2024, pp. 24–45. [with Paul Billingham]
"Rawls's Conception of Autonomy," The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy, edited by Ben Colburn (London: Routledge, 2022), pp. 96–110.
"A Framework for Analyzing Public Reason Theories," European Journal of Political Theory 21, 2022, pp. 671–691. [with Paul Billingham]
"Stability, Autonomy, and the Foundations of Political Liberalism," Law and Philosophy 41, 2022, pp. 555–582.
"Liberal Perfectionism, Moral Integrity, and Self-Respect," American Journal of Jurisprudence 63, 2018, pp. 63–79. [with Paul Billingham]
—For a response, see Matthew Kramer's "Replies," American Journal of Jurisprudence 63, 2018, pp. 145–151.
"Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes," Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17, 2018, pp. 97–113.
—For a response, see Sylvie Bláhová's "Reactive Attitudes, Moral Autonomy, and Rationalized Evil in Gerald Gaus’s Theory of Public Justification," Moral Philosophy and Politics 13, 2026, pp. 25-40.