anthony.taylor@unifr.ch
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I'm a Senior Research Fellow in Philosophy at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. I was previously a Postdoctoral Prize Research Fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford, and I completed my DPhil at Oxford in 2018.
My research is in political philosophy, moral philosophy, and the philosophy of law. I’m especially interested in the moral relationship between individuals and unjust states: whether there's ever a requirement to comply with unjust laws; when disobedience and resistance are permissible; and how these questions connect to territorial rights and international law. Much of my recent work develops a political liberal approach to legitimacy, authority, and reasonable disagreement—including a book manuscript, The Limits of Liberal Legitimacy.
I previously taught at the Asian University for Women in Bangladesh, working with students from backgrounds with historically low rates of participation in higher education.
Book:
The Limits of Liberal Legitimacy.
—Under review with Oxford University Press.
Articles:
"The Limits of Reasonable Disagreement," The Philosophical Review, Forthcoming.
"Rawls, Overlapping Consensus, and Stability for the Right Reasons," The Oxford Handbook on the Philosophy of John Rawls, edited by Christie Hartley, Blain Neufeld, and Lori Watson, Forthcoming. (with Paul Billingham)
"Territorial Jurisdiction: A Functionalist Account," Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy: Volume X, edited by David Sobel and Steven Wall (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2024), pp. 86–108.
"Can Civic Friendship Ground Public Reason?" The Philosophical Quarterly 74, 2024, pp. 24–45. (with Paul Billingham)
"Rawls's Conception of Autonomy," The Routledge Handbook of Autonomy, edited by Ben Colburn (London: Routledge, 2022), pp. 96–110.
"A Framework for Analyzing Public Reason Theories," European Journal of Political Theory 21, 2022, pp. 671–691. (with Paul Billingham)
"Stability, Autonomy, and the Foundations of Political Liberalism," Law and Philosophy 41, 2022, pp. 555–582.
"Liberal Perfectionism, Moral Integrity, and Self-Respect," American Journal of Jurisprudence 63, 2018, pp. 63–79. (with Paul Billingham)
—For a response, see Matthew Kramer's "Replies," American Journal of Jurisprudence 63, 2018, pp. 145–151.
"Public Justification and the Reactive Attitudes," Politics, Philosophy & Economics 17, 2018, pp. 97–113.
—For a response, see Sylvie Bláhová's "Reactive Attitudes, Moral Autonomy, and Rationalized Evil in Gerald Gaus’s Theory of Public Justification," Moral Philosophy and Politics, Forthcoming.
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